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3,. Where the court has authority to include unique biological 
[Material within the expansive statutory definition of property, 
^nd where a physician commercially exploits the unique 
^characteristics of a patient's bodily tissue without his 
j^nowledge or consent, and when that patient is deprived of any 
^compensation for his contribution to a multi-billion dollar 
jjroduct line derived exclusively from his unique genetic 
material, may that patient plead a cause of action for 
^conversion?
2* When a patient expressly refuses to grant researchers the 
cjommercial rights to his excised tissues, maintains reasonable 
expectations as to their use and disposition, and when his 
failure to give specific instructions concerning them is based 
upon a justifiable reliance on the researchers' false statements, 
must a claim that he has abandoned those tissues as a matter of 
law be defeated?
3. When a physician fraudulently denies knowledge of commercial 
activities or potential related to a patient's unique biological 
material, and that patient expressly refuses to grant to the 
physician's employer the commercial rights to that material, does 
an affirmative defense of consent fail?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JOHN MOORE, )
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, )
)
V. ) No. S006987
)
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY )
OF CALIFORNIA, a governmental )
agency; DAVID GOLDE, M.D.; et )
al., )
)
Defendants and Petitioners. )
__________________________________________ )
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
Consolidated Appeals From the Separate Judgments
of the
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles 
The Honorable Warren H. Deering and John L. Cole, Judges
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal, 
Second District, Division Four
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 11, 1984, John Moore, a leukemia patient, sued 
his physician, a medical researcher, the University of 
California, and two pharmaceutical companies for the conversion 
of his spleen, blood, bone marrow aspirates, and other bodily 
substances ("Blood and Bodily Substances"), and for various other 
causes founded on that allegation. After a hearing, the trial 
judge sustained three Defendants' demurrers to the third amended 
complaint with leave to amend, and dismissed those Defendants 
when Mr. Moore chose not to further amend his complaint. Several 
months later a different trial judge sustained the demurrers of
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the two remaining Defendants without leave to amend, and 
dismissed those Defendants, holding no recognized cause of action 
existed for Mr. Moore’s claim of conversion, and that the court 
did not wish to create a new cause of action.
Mr. Moore appealed the demurrers and on July 21, 1988, the 
court of appeal reversed both lower courts. Moore v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230 (1988). The court held 
that: (1) a person has a property right in his own bodily tissues 
sufficient as a matter of law to support a case of conversion;
(2) merely by consenting to removal of his spleen, Mr. Moore had 
not impliedly abandoned his organ, blood or tissue; and (3) Mr. 
Moore did not consent to either research unrelated to treatment 
or commercial exploitation of his unique genetic material. Id.
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at 1244-1256. The court also held that none of the grounds given 
by the first trial court for sustaining the demurrers were 
appropriate. Id. at 1255-1260, This court granted review on 
November 10, 1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Moore’s unique blood and blood components have 
substantial commercial value and have provided, and will continue 
to provide, significant financial and competitive advantage to 
anyone exercising control over them. (C.T. 2.)
Mr. Moore was diagnosed as having hairy-cell leukemia in 
September 1976. (C.T. 4.) Seeking an additional opinion
concerning his condition, he traveled from Alaska to the 
University of California, Los Angeles ("UCLA") Medical Center 
where he was seen by Defendant Golde and other employees of the 
Regents of the University of California ("Regents") in October
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1976. (C.T. 4-5.)
The Defendants examined Mr. Moore on October 5, 1976 and, in 
the following days, withdrew extensive amounts of his blood, bone 
marrow aspirates and other bodily substances. (C.T. 5.) 
Defendants confirmed the diagnosis of hairy-cell leukemia and 
recommended further treatment including the surgical removal of 
Mr. Moore's spleen. (C.T. 6.)
On October 19, 1976, Mr. Moore signed a consent form 
authorizing surgeons at UCLA Medical Center to remove his spleen. 
(C.T. 8.) On October 20, 1976, Defendants removed Mr, Moore's 
spleen and, without his consant, transported a portion of it to a 
separate research unit of the UCLA School of Medicine for the 
purpose of conducting non-therapeutic, commercial research.
(C.T. 9.) Aside from the removal of the spleen, none of these 
activities had any relation to Mr. Moore's medical treatment.
(C.T. 6.)
Following the operation. Defendants represented to Mr. Moore 
that follow-up visits were necessary for his health and well­
being. (C.T. 12.) Accordingly, he made at least eleven trips 
from his home in Seattle, Washington to Defendants' facilities in 
Los Angeles between October 1976 and September 1983. (C.T. 11.)
During these visits. Defendants withdrew large quantities of Mr. 
Moore's Blood and Bodily Substances. (C.T. 12.) Contrary to 
Defendants' repeated representations, these withdrawals were not 
made in furtherance of Mr. Moore's treatment, but rather to 
advance their own commercial efforts. (C.T. 12.)
Using Mr. Moore's tissues. Defendants established several 
valuable products and cell-lines, including the "Moore cell-line"
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and the "Mo cell-line." (C.r. 16.) These products and cell­
lines "were not developed or derived through any extraordinary or 
unusual scientific genius or methodology invented or employed by 
[D]efendants." (C.T, 34.) Rather, the growth of Mr. Moore's
cells was merely sustained using a growth medium commonly 
employed in the biotechnology industry. (C.T. 34.)
Without Mr. Moore's consent. Defendants disseminated samples 
of cell-lines and products derived exclusively from Mr. Moore's 
tissues to a variety of commercial research firms throughout the 
world. (C.T, 16.) During this period, Mr. Moore inquired as to 
whether Defendants had discovered anything of present or 
potential commercial value ccncerning his tissues. (C.T. 14.) 
Defendants repeatedly denied any such discoveries and, in fact, 
actively discouraged such inquiries. (C.T. 14.) Yet, at this 
time. Defendants were aware that competing commercial firms in 
the biotechnology industry had predicted a potential market of 
approximately three billion dollars for a whole range of products 
derived exclusively from Mr. Moore's tissues. (C.T. 25.)
In May 1981, Defendants Golde, the Regents, and Genetics 
Institute entered into a contract which focused solely on the 
commercial exploitation of the cell-lines and products 
originating from Mr. Moore's body. (C.T. 22.) This contract 
provided that Genetics Institute would pay Defendants Golde and 
the Regents at least $330,003.00 over a three-year period for the 
cell-lines obtained from Mr. Moore's body. (C.T. 22.) This 
contract was later modified to include Defendant Sandoz, Inc. 
("Sandoz"), giving Sandoz exclusive rights to the development of 
Mr. Moore's cell-lines and the products originating from his
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body. (C.T. 23.)
In an attempt to gain exclusive legal rights to the control 
of the "Mo cell-line," the Regents applied for a patent in May 
1979. (C.T. 17.) On January 6, 1983, the Regents filed a second 
patent application on the sane cell-line, abandoning their first 
application later that same year. (C.T. 23.) On March 20, 1984, 
a patent for the "Mo cell-line" was granted to Defendants Golde 
and Shirley Quan (a researcher employed by Regents), and 
concurrently a partial assignment was made to the Regents. (C.T. 
29. )
In an effort to prevent Mr. Moore from discovering these 
commercial activities. Defendants renamed certain valuable cell­
lines and products from "Moore," "Mo," and "Mo-B" to "RLC."
(C.T. 23.) Yet Mr. Moore contends that, had he known the truth 
concerning Defendants’ activities and the value of his tissues, 
he would have insisted upon retaining control over the ultimate 
use and disposition of them. (C.T. 32.)
On April 11, 1983, Defendants first presented Mr. Moore with 
a form requesting consent to the use of his tissues for research 
apparently related to his disease. (C.T, 25.) By this time. 
Defendants had conducted more than five years of non-therapeutic 
and commercial research, entered into several commercial 
contracts, and filed two patent applications concerning 
Mr. Moore's cell-lines. (C.T. 25.) Under the belief that such 
consent merely authorized Defendants to perform purely academic 
and non-commercial research, Mr. Moore consented to the use of 
his tissues for these limited purposes. (C.T. 26.)
Mr. Moore's final visit occurred on September 20, 1983.
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(C.T. 26.) At this time, when confronted with a modified consent 
form, Mr. Moore indicated in writing that he specifically did not 
voluntarily grant to the Defendants "any and all rights 
[he] . . . may have in any cell-line or other potential product 
which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow 
obtained from [him]," (C.T. 51.) This attempt by Defendants to
obtain rights to Mr. Moore's tissues was made a full nine months 
after they had submitted their second patent application on a 
cell-line derived from Mr. Moore's tissues. (C.T. 23.) Fully 
aware of Mr. Moore's express refusal to consent to the commercial 
exploitation of his biological material. Defendants continued 
their commercial activities by using tissues withdrawn from him 
on the very day of his refusal. (C.T. 28.)
On September 11, 1984, Mr. Moore instituted a lawsuit based 
on these events.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On this appeal of Defendants' demurrers, the facts alleged 
in Mr. Moore's complaint are to be taken as true. As alleged, 
these facts are sufficient to plead a cause of action for 
conversion. The three elements of conversion are: (1) 
plaintiff's ownership of the property at the time of the 
conversion; (2) defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or 
disposition of plaintiff's property; and (3) damages. Baldwin v. 
Marine City Properties, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 393, 410 (1978) 
(citation omitted).
The foregoing elements have been sufficiently plead in the 
Instant case. First, policy considerations compel the court to 
exercise its well-precedented authority to include human
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biological material within the expansive statutory definition of 
property. Second, Defendants wrongfully dispossessed Mr. Moore 
of his property rights in his tissues by engaging in commercial 
exploitation of their unique characteristics without his 
knowledge or consent. Third, by depriving Mr. Moore of any 
compensation for his contribution to the multi-billion dollar 
industry based on his unique genetic material. Defendants have 
caused Mr. Moore compensable damage.
At no time did Mr. Moore abandon his tissues. In fact, Mr. 
Moore's express refusal to grant Defendants commercial rights to 
his tissues and derivative products evidences his intent to 
retain dominion over them. Also, as a result of Defendants' 
statements, Mr. Moore held the reasonable expectation that his 
tissues would be used solely in connection with his medical 
treatment and then disposed of in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Health and Safety Code. Mr. Moore's intent to 
retain dominion and his reasonable expectation as to the 
disposition of his tissues are sufficient to dispute Defendants' 
claim that he intended to abandon his tissues. Therefore, the 
issue of abandonment cannot be decided as a matter of law.
Moreover, Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the 
necessity of the withdrawals of Mr. Moore's biological material 
and the nature of their subsequent research. Mr. Moore's failure 
to give specific instructions concerning the use of his tissues 
was based upon his justifiable reliance on these 
misrepresentations. Therefore, Defendants are estopped from 
asserting that this silence constitutes proof that Mr, Moore 
abandoned his tissues.
7
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Mr. Moore does not contest Defendants' removal or use of his
tissues for therapeutic research purposes. Nevertheless, he did 
not expressly or impliedly consent to their commercial 
exploitation of his tissues. Moreover, Defendants' fraudulent 
misrepresentations that they had no knowledge of any commercial 
activities or commercial potential associated with Mr. Moore's 
tissues would vitiate any such consent. Therefore, Defendants' 
affirmative defense of consent fails.
ARGUMENT
I. BY COMMERCIALLY EXPLOITING MR. MOORE'S BIOLOGICAL 
MATERIAL WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT,
DEFENDANTS HAVE COMMITTED THE TORT OF CONVERSION.
The gravamen of Mr. Moore's complaint against the Defendants
is a cause of action for conversion of his Blood and Bodily
Substances. Conversion is "[a]n unauthorized assumption and
exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal
chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their
condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights." Black’s Law
Dictionary 300 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, in order to plead a cause
of action for conversion, the following must be shown: "(1)
plaintiff[*s] ownership or right to possession of the property at
the time of the conversion; (2) defendants' conversion by a
wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff['s] property rights; and
(3) damages." Baldwin v. Marine City Properties, Inc., 79
Cal. App. 3d 393, 410 (1978) (citation omitted).
Mr. Moore's suit alleges that: (1) a patient has a property 
right in the ultimate use and disposition of Blood and Bodily 
Substances removed in the course of medical treatment; (2) 
Defendants wrongfully engaged in the commercial exploitation of
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the unique characteristics of Mr. Moore’s Blood and Bodily 
Substances without his knowledge or consent; and (3) Mr. Moore 
suffered significant damages in that he received no compensation 
for his contribution to a multi-billion dollar product line that 
would not have been possible but for his unique biological 
material. Therefore, this court should affirm the decision of 
the Second District Court of Appeal, which held that Mr. Moore 
sufficiently plead a cause of action for conversion of his Blood 
and Bodily Substances. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1258 (1988).
A. Mr. Moore has a property right in the ultimate
use and disposition of his Blood and Bodily
Substances removed in the course of medical
treatment.
A medical patient retains a right to determine the ultimate 
use and disposition of organs, blood, and other bodily substances 
removed in the course of prescribed medical treatment. While 
such a proposition may at first blush seem beyond dispute, the 
denial of this most basic right lies at the heart of the defense 
to Mr. Moore's suit. The Defendants duplicitously suggest that, 
while Mr. Moore has no property rights in his own bodily tissues, 
they, on the other hand, may use Mr. Moore’s bodily tissues in 
any manner they see fit.
Notwithstanding a paucity of legal authority or public 
policy considerations to support Defendants' assertions, they 
steadfastly maintain that the source of the material from which 
the "Mo cell-line" was derived enjoys no proprietary interest.
To the contrary, the weight of legal authority and public policy 
considerations support the recognition of Mr. Moore's claim to a
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property interest in his own biological material.
1, Human biological material is subsumed by the term 
property.
The term property is "commonly used to denote everything 
which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, 
tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; 
everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make 
up wealth or estate." Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (5th ed. 1979) 
(emphasis added). A similarly expansive definition of property 
is found in Civil Code section 654 which states: "The ownership 
of a thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and use 
it to the exclusion of others. . . . [T]he thing of which there 
may be ownership is called property." Cal. Civ. Code S 654 (West 
1970).
Thus, in legal terms, "property" does not refer merely to 
tangible goods, but rather to a collection of legal rights. Such 
a broad definition has required the courts to determine where 
property rights are to be reoognized. As one court noted: "It 
devolves upon the court to fill in the definitional vacuum [of 
property]." First Victoria Nat’l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 
1096, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980). Consequently, "law and custom may 
create property rights where none were earlier thought to exist." 
Id. at 1103. Therefore, recognition of a property interest in 
one's own biological material is within the court's inherent 
authority to give substance to the statutory definition of the 
term "property."
///
///
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2. The right to exercise dominion and control 
over one's biological material is 
recognized by California statutes.
One characteristic normally associated with property is its 
devisability. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 620 F.2d at 1103. The 
right to devise the human body or body parts has been recognized 
under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"). Cal. Health & 
Safety Code SS 7150-7156.5 (West Supp. 1989). The UAGA allows 
"[a]n individual who is at least 18 years of age [to] make an 
anatomical gift ... or [to] refuse to make an anatomical gift." 
Id. S 7150.5(a). Such a gift may be made by will. Id. S 
7150.5(b). Admittedly, the LJAGA provides an imperfect paradigm, 
for the underlying basis for the UAGA is to facilitate the supply 
of donated organs for transplantation. Nevertheless, by allowing 
prospective donors to control the ultimate use and disposition of 
their organs after death, the UAGA supports recognition of Mr. 
Moore's property rights in his own tissues.
Furthermore, Penal Code section 367f, which proscribes the 
sale of human organs for transplantation under certain 
circumstances, "[does] not apply to the person from whom the 
organ is removed." Cal. Penal Code S 367f(e) (West 1988). Thus, 
contrary to Defendant Golde's repeated assertions that it is a 
crime to sell any non-regenerative human organ, in fact, the 
Penal Code does not prevent any individual from receiving 
consideration for the removal of his or her own organ. 
(Petitioner's brief at 7, 13, 17).
Defendant Golde also argues that, because the "disposition 
of human tissue and parts is subject to regulation of the 
state[,] [it] cannot be accorded full ownership." (Petitioner's
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brief at 16). This is nothing more than a non sequitur. Merely 
because something is subject to regulation does not mean that it 
is not subject to ownership (e.g., cars, restaurants, airlines, 
and firearms are all subject to regulation, yet they may still be 
owned). As noted above, the regulations relating to body parts 
(e.g., the UAGA and Penal Code provisions) support the 
recognition of Mr. Moore's right to determine the use and 
disposition of his Blood and Bodily Substances.
3. Compensation of donors of human biological 
material is well-precedented.
The sale of unique bodily substances is not without 
precedent. In United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 
1979), a Florida woman whose blood contained a rare antibody was 
paid $200.00 per week, a $25,000.00 bonus, and provided with a 
leased automobile. Similarly, a student of the University of 
Pennsylvania reportedly was paid $150.00 for supplying 10 grams 
of nonregenerative thigh muscle. Comment, Tax Consequences of 
Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 842, 845 n.21 
(1973). Thus, not only was Mr. Moore denied the opportunity to 
refuse to participate in Defendants' commercial exploitation of 
his biological material, he was also denied the customary 
compensation for providing Defendants his unique bodily 
substances.
4. The right of publicity is akin to the right to 
control the ultimate use of one's biological 
material.
The "right of publicity" is perhaps the most closely 
analogous right to that which Mr. Moore seeks to have recognized. 
For both acknowledge a right to very personal attributes of an
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individual (i.e., one's persona and one's genetic material). The 
right of publicity recognizes a property interest in a person's 
name, likeness, characteristics, or activities. See 63A Am. Jur. 
2d Property S 8 (1984); see also Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 
U.S. 540, 544 (1891) ("A man's name is his own property, and he 
has the same right to its use and enjoyment as he has to any 
other species of property."). This right has been invoked to 
protect the economic interests of celebrities by preventing the 
unjust enrichment of those who would capitalize on the fame of 
others without affording them just compensation. See Ali v. 
Playqirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp- 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The right of publicity has been deemed assignable and 
transferable. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). However, courts have differed as to 
whether or not the right of publicity is survivable. See id. 
(right of publicity not terminated upon death of the person); cf. 
Lugosi V. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824 (1979) (right 
to exploit one's name and likeness found to be "personal to the 
artist" and therefore this right did not survive him).
Regardless of whether the right of publicity survives the 
individual, the recognition of this property right has important 
Implications for the instant case. For if a proprietary interest 
can be found in such superficial characteristics as one's 
likeness and persona, it cannot be denied that a patient's right 
to his own genetic material, the very essence of his 
individuality, is deserving cf any less protection.
Defendant Golde criticizes the applicability of the right of 
publicity on the grounds that: (1) the court decisions discussing
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that right did not "consider whether physical body parts and 
tissues are entitled to encompass these same rights"; and (2) the 
right of publicity is distinguishable because an artistic 
identity is "carefully contrived." (Petitioner’s brief at 14- 
15).
The initial argument, while true, is superfluous and does 
not deny the incongruity of recognizing property rights in one 
personal attribute (e.g., one's persona), but not in another 
(e.g., one's unique genetic material). The second argument lacks 
proper foundation. Defendant Golde cites no authority in law, 
nor basis in logic, for the proposition that only that which is 
"carefully contrived" is deserving of the protection of property 
law. In fact, precious minerals under one's land cannot be said 
to have been "carefully contrived," yet they are still subject to 
the dominion and control of the owner of the land (even if that 
owner is unaware of their value).
5. Policy considerations support recognition of a 
property interest in one's biological material.
The growth of the biotechnology industry has significantly 
altered the value of the human body. And while the prospect of 
the commercialization of human tissue may appear objectionable to 
some, the fact remains that researchers and biotechnology 
corporations will continue to profit by patenting cell-lines and 
products derived from human cells. Thus, the real issue is 
whether the sources of the material for this industry will be 
allowed to share in the derivative profits made possible by their 
unique biological material.
Notions of equity and fairness support the view that
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traditional principles of property law should apply to protect 
the donors of biological material. It is patently unfair to 
allow some to profit by the commercial exploitation of human 
cells (e.g., researchers, physicians, and biotechnology 
corporations), while the sources of the vital raw material are 
denied just compensation for their contribution. Under the 
doctrine of prior possession, a researcher who asserts a property 
interest in the cells of a dcnor (e.g., by seeking to patent a 
derivative cell-line) would be subject to the claims of the donor 
as prior possessor. See Armcry v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 665 
(K.B. 1722) (party who finds property has a superior right of 
possession above all others except the true owner). The 
recognition of the right of prior possession appropriately 
recognizes the relative contributions of the researchers and 
donors. This rule also prevents the unjust enrichment of those 
who would otherwise be able to commercially exploit a donor's 
unique biological material without providing any form of 
compensation.
A disturbing aspect of the emergence of commercialization of 
human cells is the direct participation of the physician in such 
activities. As typified by the behavior of Dr. Golde in the 
instant case, the treating physician has a strong motivation to 
withhold material Information from the patient. By refusing to 
disclose to the patient the true commercial potential of a 
patient’s cells, the physician seeks to avoid a protracted legal 
dispute over control of the patient's biological material. This 
situation breeds mistrust between patient and physician and 
resentment by the patient whose fundamental contribution is not
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recognized.
Acknowledging a patient's right to control the ultimate use 
of his cells would require the physician to be forthright in 
obtaining the informed consent of the patient to commercial 
exploitation of the patient's cells. Recognition of this right 
would also obviate the resentment which a patient would hold 
toward a physician who was seen to profit from the nonconsensual 
exploitation of the patient's biological material.
6. Summary
Support for Mr. Moore's claim to a protectable property 
interest in his own biological material has been based on: (1) 
the broad authority of the court to give substance to the term 
"property"; (2) the provisions of the UAGA which acknowledge the 
right of a donor to determine the ultimate use and disposition of 
certain bodily parts after death; (3) precedent for the sale of 
both regenerative and non-regenerative bodily tissues; (4) an 
examination of the closely analogous "right of publicity"; and 
finally (5) policy considerations which weigh in favor of the 
recognition of a property interest in one's own biological 
material. For these reasons, Mr. Moore has properly alleged a 
property interest in his Blood and Bodily Substances, and 
therefore the reversal of the demurrers by the court of appeal 
was correct.
B. Defendants wrongfully engaged in the commercial 
exploitation of the unique characteristics of Mr.
Moore's Blood and Bodily Substances without his
knowledge or consent.
Whereas conversion is a strict liability tort, it is 
unnecessary to delve into the intent of Defendants in order to
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establish the act of conversion. See City of Los Angeles v. 
Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 143, 149 (1978). Rather, it is 
the mere ’’wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff ['s] property 
rights" by the Defendants which must be shown to plead a cause of 
action for conversion. Bald>;in v. Marine City Properties, Inc., 
79 Cal. App. 3d 393, 410 (1978). Therefore, the critical issue 
is whether Defendants interfered with Mr. Moore's property 
interest in his biological material by commercially exploiting 
his unique tissue without his knowledge or consent.
Mr. Moore concedes that Defendants had a right to examine 
his tissue for therapeutic and general research purposes. Such 
authorization was confirmed by Mr. Moore's written consent during 
his September 1983 visit to JCLA. However, at no time did Mr, 
Moore relinquish his rights to cell-lines and products derived 
from his tissues to Defendants, In fact, Mr. Moore expressly 
refused to grant to Defendants any such interest as evidenced by 
the same September 1983 written consent form. (C.T. 51.)
Notwithstanding Mr. Moore's clearly expressed desire to 
retain control over his biological material. Defendants obtained 
a patent to a cell-line and other products derived from Mr. 
Moore's unique tissue. The wrongful conduct of Defendants 
thereby deprived Mr. Moore of any further control over the 
ultimate use and disposition of his unique biological material 
without any compensation. By doing so. Defendants substantially 
interfered with Mr. Moore's property right in his own biological 
naterial and are hence liable for conversion.
///
U/
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C. Where Mr. Moore's unique biological material
is used by Defendants, without compensation^
to produce commercially valuable substances,
his damages may be found to be substantial.
With respect to damages, California law provides:
The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion 
of personal property is presumed to be:
First - the value of the property at the time 
of the conversion, with the interest from that 
time, or, an amount sufficient to indemnify
the party injured for the loss which is the
natural, reasonable and proximate result of the
wrongful act complained of and which a proper 
degree of prudence on his part would not have 
averted.
Cal. Civ. Code S 3336 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
An important factor to consider in determining the value of 
Mr. Moore's tissues is that the underlying value of the market 
for derivative products lies in the unique ability of his tissues 
to produce large quantities of commercially valuable substances. 
Although Defendants have sought to minimize the importance of Mr. 
Moore’s biological material in the development of the cell-line 
and other commercial byproducts, the facts belie the notion that 
it was they who gave value to Mr. Moore's otherwise worthless 
tissues. In fact. Defendants merely employed non-unique and non­
extraordinary scientific processes to create the "Mo cell-line" 
by taking Mr. Moore's spleen and cells and placing them in a 
growth medium. To place Defendants' contribution in perspective, 
it must be noted that:
The ability to manipulate human cells into a 
continuously growing cell culture in the 
laboratory to produce a "cell-line" requires 
a certain level of competence and expertise.
This ability, however, is not scarce among
IB
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
those familiar with genetic engineering. 
Therefore, causing cells to grow continuously 
is not a trait that would warrant patent 
protection absent other unusual traits of the 
cells.
Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality; Recognizing Property 
Rights in the Commercial Valae of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 
207, 222 n,77 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Toward the Right of 
Commerciality] (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Therefore, the true source of the value of Defendants' 
patented cell-line and derivative byproducts lies in Mr. Moore's 
unique biological material which made the "Mo cell-line" 
possible. In essence, without Mr. Moore's unique cells. 
Defendants would not have been able to derive the patented cell­
line. In fact, numerous other researchers could have developed 
the cell-line using the same commonly employed methods used by 
Defendants.
Although determination of the market value of human tissues 
is not something with which the courts are familiar, estimates of 
the market value of cell-lines and products originating from Mr. 
Moore's body have been made and their validity can be examined 
through expert testimony at trial. Thus, the trier of fact may 
consider the testimony of biotechnology experts and economists in 
order to determine the appropriate value of Mr. Moore's unique 
biological material. The essential inquiry concerns the value of 
Mr. Moore's unique biological material to a biotechnology firm 
that could have used the material, with the consent of the donor, 
to develop highly beneficial and commercially valuable products. 
Such testimony would provide the basis for determining Mr.
Moore's compensatory damages.
In addition to Defendants’ liability for compensatory
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damages. Civil Code section 3294 entitles a plaintiff to 
exemplary damages "[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation 
not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of 
oppression, fraud, or malice." Cal. Civ. Code S 3294 (West 
Supp. 1989). Furthermore, this court has recognized that 
"[e]xemplary damages are properly awarded in an action for 
conversion, given the required showing of malice, fraud or 
oppression." Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 681 (1941) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). Whereas Defendants 
misrepresented the true nature of their commercial exploitation 
of Mr. Moore’s unique biological material in response to his 
inquiries, a finding of fraud by the Defendants would thus 
entitle Mr. Moore to an award of exemplary damages as well.
(C.T. 13-14.)
II. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF 
ABANDONMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND BY THEIR 
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS, THEY ARE ESTOPPED FROM 
ASSERTING THAT MR. MOORE’S SILENCE CONSTITUTED 
ABANDONMENT.
Mr. Moore's simple consent to removal of his tissues did not 
constitute abandonment as a matter of law. Abandonment is 
defined as the "voluntary giving up of a thing by the owner 
because he no longer desires to possess it or assert any right or 
dominion over it and is entirely indifferent as to what may 
become of it or as to who may thereafter possess it." Martin v. 
Cassidy, 149 Cal. App. 2d 106, 110 (1957) (citation omitted).
"The primary elements of abandonment are the intention to 
abandon and the external act by which the intention is carried 
into effect. The intention to abandon is considered the first 
and paramount inquiry." Pickens v. Johnson, 107 Cal. App. 2d
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
778, 787 (1951). Defendants fail to demonstrate that these 
elements have been alleged as a matter of law.
A. Mr. Moore's express refusal to grant Defendants
any and all rights to his tissues, coupled with
his reasonable expectations as to their use and
disposition, preclude a determination of
abandonment as a matter of law.
The question of intent to abandon may only be treated as a 
question of law when there is no dispute as to the facts or 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Herbert v. Graham, 72 Cal.
App. 2d 314, 316 (1925). Where a dispute exists, the issue is to 
be resolved by the finder of fact, based upon "all the facts and 
circumstances of the case." Peal v. Red Gulf Cedar Co., 15 Cal. 
App. 2d 196, 199 (1936). For the reasons indicated below, the 
issue of abandonment in this case should be decided by the trier 
of fact.
In September 1983, Defendants presented Mr. Moore with a 
consent form wherein he declined to "voluntarily grant to the 
University of California any and all rights [he] . . . may have 
in any cell-line or any other potential product which might be 
developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from [him]." 
(C.T. 26-27.) Mr. Moore thereby denied Defendants the commercial 
rights to his biological material on the only occasion he was 
given an opportunity to state a preference. This denial is 
strong evidence that he was not at all indifferent as to the 
disposition of his tissues (i.e., he had not abandoned them).
Moreover, Mr. Moore held reasonable expectations concerning 
the disposition of his tissues which preclude a finding that he 
intended to abandon them. In the absence of specific 
instructions from Mr. Moore concerning the use of his biological
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material, the most logical way for the finder of fact to 
determine his unspoken intent is to examine the reasonable 
expectations of a medical patient under these circumstances.
Defendants stated to Mr. Moore that the removal of his 
spleen and the subsequent withdrawals of his Blood and Bodily 
Substances were necessary for his health and well-being. (C.T.
5, 11.) It would therefore be reasonable for Mr. Moore to expect 
that his tissues would be examined by Defendants solely in 
furtherance of his medical treatment.
Moreover, the Health and Safety Code requires that human 
tissue shall be disposed of following the conclusion of 
scientific use, normally by interment or incineration. Cal. 
Health & Safety Code S 7054.4 (West Supp. 1989). In light of 
this statutory requirement, it would have been reasonable for Mr. 
Moore to expect that Defendants would dispose of his tissues 
after their examination. It would certainly not have been 
reasonable to expect that Defendants would commercially exploit 
his unique biological material without his knowledge or consent.
Abandonment requires a total indifference as to the 
disposition of one's property. Mr. Moore expressly refused to 
grant Defendants the rights to his tissues, and maintained 
reasonable expectations as to their use and disposition. These 
facts are sufficient to dispute Defendants' claim that he 
Intended to abandon his tissues, thereby precluding a 
determination of abandonment as a matter of law.
///
///
///
22
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
B. Where Mr» Moore’s silence resulted from his
justifiable relianc;e on Defendants' misrepre­
sentations, Defendants are estopped from asserting 
that this silence constituted abandonment.
As a result of Defendants' misrepresentations to Mr. Moore, 
they are estopped from claiming that Mr. Moore's failure to give 
specific instructions as to the disposition of his tissues 
constitutes an intent to abandon. "The essence of an estoppel is 
that the party to be estopped has by false language or conduct 
'led another to do that which he would not otherwise have done 
and as a result thereof he has suffered injury.'" State Comp. 
Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp, appeals Bd., 40 Cal. 3d 5, 16 (1985) 
(citation omitted).
1. Defendants made numerous misrepresentations to 
Mr. Moore concerning the medical necessity of 
the withdrawals and their knowledge of commercial 
activity related to his biological material.
Throughout Mr. Moore's treatment. Defendants stated to him 
that the withdrawals of his tissue were necessary for his health 
and well-being. (C.T. 12.) However, aside from the removal of 
nis spleen, "none of these samples or specimens . . . were used 
cy Defendants to further or improve his health and well-being." 
[C.T. 13.) In fact. Defendants used these tissues "solely to 
further [their own] independent research purposes." (C.T. 13.)
Defendants also stated to Mr. Moore that they were engaged 
-n strictly academic and purely scientific research in an effort 
:o determine the cause of, and a possible cure for, his disease. 
C.T. 13.) These representations were made while Defendants were 
n the process of conducting non-therapeutic and commercial 
•esearch which was totally independent of Mr. Moore's medical
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care. (C.T. 12-13.)
Defendants also made repeated misrepresentations concerning 
the commercial potential of '^r. Moore's tissues. Mr. Moore 
pointedly asked the Defendants whether they had discovered 
anything about his tissues which "was or might be presently or in 
the future related to any scientific activity resulting in 
commercial or financial benefits of any kind and in any amount." 
(C.T. 14.) Defendants denied any such discoveries, while at the 
same time they entered into negotiations and commercial contracts 
which concerned cell-lines and other products originating from 
Mr. Moore's body. (C.T. 19, 21-22.)
Most significantly, these representations were made while 
Defendants were aware that published reports in biotechnology 
industry publications were estimating a multi-billion dollar 
market for products derived from Mr. Moore's tissues. (C.T. 25.)
It should be noted that Defendant Golde misstates the facts 
when he asserts that "[t]he record clearly shows that Mr. Moore 
limited his inquiries to the use of his blood and other bodily 
substances withdrawn subsequent to surgery." (Petitioner's brief 
at 24). In fact, the complaint states that Mr. Moore's inquiries 
concerned his "Blood and Bodily Substances," a term defined to 
include his spleen. (C.T. 2, 13-14.)
2. Mr. Moore's reliance on Defendants’ false 
representations caused him to refrain from 
asserting his right to control the use of 
his biological material.
The only logical inference that can be drawn from 
Defendants' repeated misrepresentations is that they intended for 
Mr. Moore to rely on them, and thereby refrain from asserting his
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right to control the use of his tissues. Consequently, Mr. Moore 
was denied compensation for his contribution to the products 
derived from his tissues.
"To create an equitable estoppel, ’it is enough if the party 
has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such 
action as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved his 
position and saved himself from loss.'" Benner v. Industrial 
Accident Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 346, 349-350 (1945) (citation 
omitted).
Benner, plaintiff's delay in asserting her workmen's 
compensation claim was induced by her Justifiable reliance on the 
defendants' conduct. This court held that, as a result, 
defendants were estopped from invoking a statute of limitations 
defense to plaintiff's claim. Id. at 350.
Mr. Moore has stated that, had he been aware of Defendants' 
non-therapeutic and commercial use of his tissues, he would have 
conditioned his consent to their removal on his continued control 
and just compensation. However, Defendants' misrepresentations 
lulled Mr. Moore into believing that they were acting in 
accordance with his desires, and therefore he made no objections 
and gave no specific instructions concerning the use of his 
biological material.
3. Defendants' fiduciary duty to Mr, Moore, 
and the duty of full and fair disclosure 
they created by undertaking to speak, 
justify Mr. Moore’s reliance on their 
representations.
There is no question that Mr. Moore was justified in relying 
on Defendants' representations. The law recognizes a fiduciary 
relationship between a physician and patient which requires the
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physician "to make a full and fair disclosure to [the patient] of 
all facts which materially affect . . . his rights and 
interests." Bowman v. McPhesters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 800 
(1947).
In Bowman, the cause of action was based on the physician's 
fraudulent concealment of material facts concerning the extent of 
injuries which served as the basis of the patient's malpractice 
claim. Id. at 797. The court held that the physician's 
fraudulent concealment prevented the patient from discovering the 
relevant facts and therefore the physician was estopped from 
asserting a statute of limitations defense. id. at 804.
In the instant case. Defendants' statements as to the 
necessity of the withdrawals for Mr. Moore's health and well­
being related directly to his medical care. Therefore, his 
reliance was justified based on this fiduciary relationship.
Defendants' denial of knowledge of any commercial potential 
or activities should also be included under this fiduciary duty. 
With the recent development of the biotechnology industry, a huge 
commercial potential has been realized in the human body.
However, the public is largely ignorant of this potential, 
allowing researchers to enjoy a free supply of patient tissue.
See Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality, supra p. 19, at 227.
Insofar as this commercial potential may be a factor in the 
patient's decision to permit the removal of bodily tissues, a 
physician's fiduciary duty should require full and fair 
disclosure of the economic as well as the health aspects of any 
such decision. Therefore, Defendants' misrepresentations 
concerning their knowledge of the commercial potential of Mr.
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Moore's biological material should be deemed a breach of a 
fiduciary duty, upon which Mr. Moore was entitled to rely.
Should the court not so interpret the scope of Defendants' 
fiduciary duty, Mr. Moore's reliance was still justified based 
upon the duty of full and fair disclosure created when Defendants 
undertook to speak. "Regardless of whether one is under a duty 
to speak or disclose facts, one who does speak must speak the 
whole truth, and not by partial suppression or concealment make 
the utterance wrongful or misleading." American Trust Co. v. 
California Western States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 65 
(1940).
This policy is also recognized by the statutory definition 
of deceit, which includes "[t]he suppression of a fact, by one 
who is bound to disclose it or who gives information of other 
facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of 
that fact." Cal. Civ. Code S 1710.3 (West 1985).
By representing to Mr. >^oore that they were engaged in 
strictly academic and purely scientific research. Defendants 
created a duty for themselves of full disclosure as to their 
activities. They breached this duty by concealing their 
negotiations, commercial contracts, and patent applications.
They further breached this duty by denying that there was any 
commercial potential associated with Mr. Moore's tissues while at 
the same time they conducted commercial research and were aware 
of industry projections of the huge market potential for products 
derived from his tissues.
As a result of Mr. Moore's justifiable reliance on these 
misrepresentations, he did not object to Defendants' activities.
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nor give specific instructions as to the use and disposition of
his biological material. As Defendants are responsible for this
silence, they are estopped from asserting that it constitutes
proof that Mr. Moore abandoned his tissues.
III. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT MR. MOORE NEVER CONSENTED TO 
THE COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF HIS TISSUES, AND ANY 
SUCH CONSENT WOULD HAVE BEEN VITIATED BY DEFENDANTS' 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS.
Mr. Moore's consent to removal of his tissues would be a 
viable defense if he were claiming that the removal constituted a 
conversion. See Klett v. Se^rurlty Acceptance Co., 38 Cal. 2d 
770, 789 (1952) (consent is ordinarily a defense to a charge of 
conversion). However, Mr. Moore's claim arises not from the 
removal, but from Defendants exceeding the scope of his consent 
by using his tissues for their own commercial benefit.
A. The facts alleged do not support Defendants' claim
that Mr. Moore expressly consented to commercial
exploitation of his spleen or other bodily tissues.
On the facts alleged in the complaint, there is no basis for 
determining that Mr. Moore expressly consented to commercial 
exploitation of his spleen. The consent form for the splenectomy 
is not a part of the record and therefore the scope of this 
consent cannot be decided on a demurrer. Rather, it should be 
reserved for trial, where the limits of Mr. Moore's express 
consent can be determined on the basis of physical and 
testimonial evidence.
Nor is there any evidence in the record which indicates that 
Mr. Moore expressly consented to commercial exploitation of his 
tissues removed on subsequent visits. In fact, it was not until 
Defendants had conducted seven years of independent commercial
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research that they sought this express consent. Given the 
opportunity, Mr. Moore expressly declined to relinquish his 
commercial rights to his tissues and any products which might be 
derived from them. Yet, even after Mr. Moore expressly withheld 
such consent, the Defendants proceeded to commercially exploit 
the tissues removed on the very day he denied them those rights.
B. Defendants* concealment of their commercial research
and the market potential of Mr. Moore*s biological
material make a finding of implied consent to
commercial exploitation unreasonable.
Any assertion that there was an implied consent to 
Defendants' commercial activities is without merit. At all 
times, the Defendants concealed from Mr. Moore that they were 
involved in commercial research and that there was any commercial 
potential associated with his tissues. In light of Defendants' 
concealment, the fact that Mr. Moore did not expressly forbid 
commercial exploitation until September 1983, does not imply that 
he consented to commercial exploitation before that time. 
Moreover, it is logically inconsistent to assume that Mr. Moore 
impliedly consented to commercial exploitation of his tissues, 
when he expressly refused to grant such consent on the only 
occasion that such a possibility was revealed to him.
C. Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations
concerning their kno;>;ledge of any commercial
potential and activities associated with Mr.
Moore's tissues, vitiate any express or implied
consent to their comTierclal exploitation.
"[C]onsent, in law, is "nore than a mere formal act of the 
mind. It is an act unclouded by fraud, duress, or sometimes even 
mistake." Freedman v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 56 Cal. 2d 454, 
457 (1961) (citation omitted). In Freedman, the insured jeweler
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was fraudulently induced to hand over diamonds to an 
impersonator. When the jeweler sought to recover from the 
defendant insurance company, the defendant contended that a 
conversion had not occurred because the insured had consented to 
the transfer. This court held that consent did not negate the 
conversion where that consent was procured by fraud. Id.
For a statement to be fraudulent, one must show; (1) a 
representation as to a material fact? (2) the representation was 
false and known to be false by the party making it; (3) the 
statement was made with the intent to induce the other party to 
do or refrain from doing some act; (4) another party relied on 
the statement; (5) that the relying party was ignorant of the 
falsity of the representation and reasonably believed it to be 
true; and (6) that the relying party thereby suffered damage or 
injury. 34 Cal. Jur. 3d Fraud and Deceit S 6 (1977).
Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations meet these 
requirements.
First, Defendants' statements concerned material facts. Mr. 
Moore did not simply ask Defendants if they knew the value of his 
tissues, he asked if they had any knowledge of past, present, or 
potential scientific activity resulting in commercial or 
financial benefits of any kind. (C.T. 14.) That Defendants 
themselves were conducting commercial research shows that this 
was a question of verifiable fact, not opinion. By hiding the 
truth. Defendants deprived Mr, Moore of information which would 
have been material to him, both in deciding whether or not to 
consent to commercial exploitation, and in determining the 
direction and scope of his medical treatment.
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Second, Defendants' denials of such knowledge were false and 
they knew them to be false. Defendants were at the time engaged 
in negotiations and were thenselves conducting commercial 
research. They must certainly be charged with knowledge of their 
own actions.
Third, the facts alleged lead to the conclusion that 
Defendants intended to induce Mr. Moore into refraining from 
asserting his rights to control the use of his tissues. Their 
concern could not have been that Mr. Moore would have forgone 
the withdrawals, thereby jeopardizing his treatment, because none 
of the tissues withdrawn on the subsequent visits were ever used 
to improve his health and well-being. Rather, they were used for 
Defendants' own benefit.
Fourth, Mr. Moore relied on Defendants' misrepresentations. 
He has stated that, had he been aware of the truth, he would have 
conditioned his consent to removal on his continued control and 
just compensation. As indicated in the analysis of abandonment, 
Mr. Moore's reliance was justified based on a fiduciary 
relationship and the duty of full and fair disclosure Defendants 
created by undertaking to speak when they made their denials.
Fifth, Mr. Moore did not know, nor did he have any reason to 
know, that Defendants' statements were false. (C.T. 27.) Mr. 
Moore lived several hundred miles from Defendants' facilities and 
his visits were for short periods, spread out over seven years. 
His only reasonable method of obtaining information about his 
tissues was to query those who removed them.
Finally, Mr. Moore has suffered damage in that he has been 
deprived of any compensation for his contribution to a multi-
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billion dollar industry based on his unique biological material.
Defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations concerned facts 
which would have been material to Mr. Moore in deciding whether 
to consent to commercial exploitation of his tissues. Therefore, 
any such consent, either express or implied, is rendered 
ineffective as a defense to 'ir. Moore's claim of conversion.
Defendant Golde's contention that Mr. Moore's consent to 
surgery should be construed broadly is unpersuasive. Golde cites 
a North Carolina case when he asserts that, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, a patient's consent to medical treatment 
should be construed as general in nature. (Petitioner's brief at 
31). These words, taken out of context, ascribe a far more 
expansive meaning to the holding than is warranted. In the cited 
case, the North Carolina court was referring to the fact that, in 
major surgery, neither the patient nor the surgeon can know the 
patient's exact condition until the incision has been made. 
Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 362, 90 S.E.2d 754, 759 (1956). 
The court held that, in such a case, the consent "will be 
construed as general in nature and the surgeon may extend the 
operation to remedy any abnormal or diseased condition in the 
area of the original incision whenever he, in the exercise of his 
sound professional judgment, determines that correct surgical 
procedure dictates and requires such an extension." id.
(emphasis added).
Authorization to remedy an abnormal or diseased condition, 
discoverable only during surgery, does not imply an authorization 
to engage in nonconsensual, commercial exploitation of a 
patient's biological material. Moreover, such a broad
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construction of consent direDtly contravenes the long-established 
doctrine of contra proferentem. This doctrine holds that, in the 
case of uncertainty, an agreement is to be interpreted against 
the drafter. Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 206 (1979).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore urges this court to recognize his right to control 
the ultimate use and disposition of his unique and commercially 
valuable biological material. To deny him this right, while 
permitting physicians, researchers, and biotechnology firms to 
commercially exploit his unique genetic material, would clearly 
lead to incongruous and untenable results. Refusal to 
acknowledge this most basic right can only breed mistrust and 
abuse in the physician-patient relationship by denying patient- 
donors any compensation for their contribution, while permitting 
others to profit thereby. To the contrary, this court should 
exercise its inherent authority to recognize this fundamental 
right based upon the well-established doctrines of property and 
contract law which govern the acquisition and transfer of all 
things of value.
Defendants told Mr. Moore that the withdrawals were 
necessary for his health and well-being, while they used his 
tissues solely for their own financial benefit. They repeatedly 
told him that they were involved in strictly academic and purely 
scientific research, while they entered into commercial contracts 
and obtained a patent on a valuable cell-line derived from his 
unique tissues. In essence. Defendants told Mr. Moore what they 
thought he wanted to hear, while they did what they wanted to do. 
In this manner, they all but guaranteed that he would raise no
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objections. To allow Defendants to then claim that Mr. Moore’s 
silence constituted abandonment would not only deny Mr. Moore 
justice in the instant case, it would also erode the physician- 
patient relationship. Therefore, Defendants should be estopped 
from asserting the affirmative defense of abandonment.
Initially, the Defendants did not request Mr. Moore's 
consent to the commercial use of his tissues. They used his 
tissues anyway. Defendants then asked for his consent and he 
withheld it. Undaunted, they continued their commercial 
exploitation of his biological material. Defendants said they 
had no knowledge of any commercial activities related to his 
tissues, even though they were engaged in these same activities.
The record shows that Mr. Moore never consented to 
Defendants’ commercial exploitation of his tissues. Moreover, 
any such consent would have been vitiated by their fraudulent 
misrepresentations. Thus, having no support in the facts or in 
law. Defendants' affirmative defense of consent must also fall.
Whereas the facts alleged in the complaint sufficiently 
establish a cause of action in conversion, and Defendants have 
failed to demonstrate the elements of either abandonment or 
consent as a matter of law, the decision of the court of appeal 
should be affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court. 
Dated; November 16, 1989
Respectfully Submitted,
